In a fully self-enforcing environment, individuals can execute market transactions exclusively on the basis of trust. However, the presence of individuals showing self-regarding preferences causes serious impediments to the development and even the existence of market transactions. An enforcing legal system helps to control for the lack of trust existing in every modern society. The article provides a theoretical investigation accompanied by a numerical simulation of the impact of the introduction of a costly legal system that makes contracts binding. Therefore, it investigates the choice between legally binding contracts, which are costly to verify and enforce, and non-binding contracts, which simply rely on trust, in both one-shot and repeated interactions. We …nd that a legal system protecting property rights mainly produces bene…ts when e¤ort is particularly valuable. In the other circumstances, the bene…ts are marginal. A subset of parameters also exists in which the legal system is detrimental. This is especially the case of standardized production. Finally, reputation unleashes its welfare-enhancing properties when e¤ort is very valuable, otherwise the bene…ts are trivial.
Introduction
Contract law textbooks usually suggest that if the parties are gentlemen, contracts could simply be …nalized by a handshake. These contracts rely on the honorability and honesty of the counterparties, which give rise to trust as an enforcement mechanism.
1 In the words of Arrow (1974) , trust is indeed an important lubricant of the social system. Nevertheless, according to a saying recalled by Grosheide (1998: 91) , "honor does not belong to the province of civil law" and some individuals can act strategically and decide whether to ful…ll or to breach an agreement if it is legally non-binding. Therefore, we can generally distinguish two types of individuals: one type showing "emotional" preferences and precommitting to behave honestly; another type acting without precommitment according to self-regarding preferences and representing a serious setback to self-enforceability and even to the emergence of markets.
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One of the main purposes of a legal system is to provide alternative devices to solve the crucial problem of contract enforcement. As highlighted by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) , without legal institutions to enforce contracts, trade may turn out to be ine¢ cient if rational individuals do not trust their counterparty to carry out the agreed transaction. However, contracts are often di¢ cult to enforce, regardless of the object of the transaction. The main reason is that contracts are usually incomplete, making it very costly for parties to invest in enforcement by legal means (Spier, 1992; Irlenbusch, 2006) . Examples are easy to …nd in agricultural contracts, family law, house maintenance services, and international contracts. Institutions are mainly responsible for this di¢ culty due to the problems related to third-party veri…cation of the terms of the con- 1 The rationale for honest behavior is referred to in di¤erent strands of the literature. For instance, guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) or lying aversion (Gneezy, 2005; Lundquist et al., 2009) helps to explain honest behavior in unenforceable economic transactions.
2 See, for instance, the experimental work of Fehr et al. (1997) , in which social preferences, if able to be disclosed, produce e¢ ciency gains and increase the size and extent of trade. 1 tract and the enforcement costs in courts (Boehm, 2013; Cappelen et al., 2014) .
Reputation e¤ects have also been considered in the literature (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989; Klein and Murphy, 1997; Baker et al., 2002) as the main (and possibly cheapest) way to solve the problem of contract enforceability without incurring any legal/institutional costs.
Given this background, in this paper, we provide further insights into the following issues. Legal institutions, especially courts of law, regulate property rights and allow for legally binding contracts. However, as argued, these tasks are carried out at a cost vis-à-vis a fully self-enforcing environment in which individuals can costlessly execute market transactions exclusively on the basis of trust. We therefore want to compare the impact on social welfare of an enforcing legal system in which individuals can choose between binding contracts, which are enforceable at a cost, and non-binding contracts, which are only selfenforceable, with that in a setting in which an enforcing legal system is absent and individuals can only adopt non-binding contracts. The main research questions in this respect are the following. How much do we gain in terms of social surplus when we introduce a legal system with its enforcement schemes so that individuals can choose whether to use it or otherwise to adopt non-binding contracts and rely on trust? What drives the choice, when possible, between binding and non-binding contracts? What is the role of reputation when individuals face this choice? To answer these questions, …rst we need to investigate the equilibrium conditions of the choice between legally binding and costly contracts and non-binding contracts in both one-shot and repeated games. Then, we provide an estimate through numerical simulations of the e¢ ciency in terms of social welfare achieved with respect to the putative …rst-best contract of a setting in which only non-binding (self-enforceable) contracts exist.
3 Finally, we estimate the e¢ ciency achieved when individuals are confronted with the choice between binding and non-binding contracts.
Our main …ndings are the following. A legal system protecting property rights produces mainly bene…ts. These bene…ts can be measured carefully through our numerical simulations given our assumptions. As expected, large bene…ts can be achieved when enforcement is not very costly in an untrustworthy environment. Important gains from trade can especially be achieved in high-quality production, timely deliveries, etc. and in all circumstances in which e¤ort productivity is important. In this case, widespread honesty is not a su¢ cient enforcement device and, therefore, an enforcing legal system may be socially desirable. However, a legal system can also be detrimental with respect to a fully self-enforcing environment. This occurs for a subset of parameters, especially for standardized production. Finally, reputation has welfare-enhancing properties when e¤ort is very valuable, whereas the bene…ts are trivial for standardized production.
This paper relates to two important strands of theoretical literature: principalagent models and signaling theory. Consider a set-up with an enforcing legal system. We propose a principal-agent model in which the two parties enter a transaction in which the principal is the contract designer and has to decide whether to propose a binding or a non-binding contract. The agent decides whether to accept or reject the o¤er. If the agent rejects it, the game ends. If the agent accepts it, then he provides the service required and waits for the principal to pay the expected price for the service, which is observable at no cost.
We refer to a contract as binding when one of the two parties (the principal) bears ex ante some costs that make the terms of the agreement legally veri…able in front of an impartial third party (e.g., a court of law), so that the principal has to honor the contract and pay the price whenever the observed service 3 corresponds to that originally required. We refer to a contract as non-binding when the terms of the contract remain unveri…able and therefore unenforceable or when ex post veri…ability is too costly and thus unavailable. Accordingly, honesty, and consequently trust, will necessarily play a role. The principal decides whether or not to ful…ll the agreement according to her type: an honest principal will always ful…ll it, whereas a purely self-interested principal will not, unless it is strategically convenient for her reputation.
In the modern principal-agent literature, emotional or social preferences have assumed increasing relevance. In the binding contract, emotional or social preferences cannot be disclosed due to the full completeness of the contract. On the contrary, this type of preferences are relevant to the non-binding contract due to its incomplete nature. In general, we can distinguish between one-sided reciprocity, or one-sided giving, and two-sided reciprocity, or more simply reciprocity. In one-sided giving, one party shares with another party without consideration of the other party's sharing behavior, whereas reciprocal behavior is generally the tendency to reciprocate kind acts with kindness and unkind acts with spite. 4 Our case can be assimilated to the …rst category. Both principal and agent can show emotional preferences, although agents cannot disclose their emotional preferences because they cannot reciprocate the principal's acts. The set-up of the model implies that the agent simply ful…lls the required duty by delivering exactly the required e¤ort once he enters the transaction. 5 The principal then decides whether to honor the contract according to his propensity for honesty. In a way, the principal rewards the agent's trust, not his pro-social behavior, and more realistically the principal acts to adhere to social or moral norms. The role of emotional behavior as a contract enforcement device has 4 Regarding one-sided reciprocity, see Fehr et al. (1997) ; concerning two-sided reciprocity, see . For a comparison between one-sided and two-sided reciprocity, see Malmendier et al. (2013) . 5 The principal can perfectly observe the agent's e¤ort at no cost, so that the agent cannot "cheat." 4 been investigated theoretically and experimentally by many in ‡uential economists. 6 For the purpose of this paper, we are not interested in the driving forces behind behaving fairly and honestly to ful…ll non-binding contracts. We simply assume that a share of individuals precommit to behaving honestly, meaning that they do not consider breaching an agreement as a feasible strategy.
The principal's type is private information. Initially, signaling theory produced models with agents holding private information (for instance Spence, 1973) . Later, several important papers, starting with Myerson (1983) , reversed the asymmetric information in favor of principals. Maskin and Tirole (1990) also showed that an "informed principal" can easily be found in real market transactions (e.g., franchising agreements). Cases may also occur in which a principal has full bargaining power against an agent in the supply of goods or services, such as outsourcing contracts in which a large …rm exploits its contracting power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to a small …rm, which is only required to satisfy a participation constraint. In our informed principal set-up, the principal's choice regarding the contract to propose can be interpreted as a signal of the principal's type, regardless of the nature of the transaction. It corresponds to the intention to ful…ll or renege on a non-binding promise and con…rms the classical view in economics, initiated by the seminal paper by Crawford and Sobel (1982) , that non-binding contracts are nothing but cheap talk. Honest principals would like to signal and separate themselves in equilibrium in order to be "recognized" by the agent. However, contrary to many signaling games (see for instance Cho and Kreps, 1987) , whenever a non-binding contract is proposed in equilibrium, the agent is not able to recognize the principal's type and, therefore, no separating equilibrium exists. This depends on the structure of preferences that induces sel…sh principals always to mimic honest principals.
A similar conclusion arises even when allowing parties to trade repeatedly.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the general speci…cation of the model. Sections 3 and 4 present the results for the oneshot game and for the repeated game, respectively, when an enforcing legal system allows for a choice between binding and non-binding contracts. Section 5 describes the welfare comparisons between the social optimum and various types of decentralized solutions. Finally, Section 6 discusses the main results and concludes the paper.
The model
In the following principal-agent model, a risk-neutral principal (P ) (she) asks a risk-neutral agent (A) (he) to provide a service requiring a positive e¤ort level (e) in exchange for a positive price (p). P makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (e; p)
to A, who decides whether to accept or reject the o¤er. 7 If A rejects the o¤er, the game ends; if A accepts the o¤er, he provides an e¤ort levelẽ and waits for P to pay the promised price. P observesẽ at no cost. The terms of an N B contract (e N B ; p N B ) are not veri…able and not enforceable by a court of law. Thus, in case of a breach of the contract, the law does not provide a remedy because of the absence of an enforcing legal system tout court.
7 As in Fehr et al. (1997) , we consider a very competitive market of services supplied by numerous agents. This allows principals to have strong bargaining power and o¤er contracts with expected zero rents for the agents. 8 The assumption of perfect observability of the agent's e¤ort makes trust unilateral: the agent has to decide whether or not the principal deserves trust. The perfect observability of e¤ort can also be found in Gächter and Falk (2002) , Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) , and . When e¤ort is not perfectly observable, as in MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) , the principal can solicit the agent's fairness to provide high e¤ort levels through generous bonuses. In this case, trust becomes bilateral.
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We can also suppose that the contract is far too costly either to enforce ex post in front of a court of law or to verify ex post by an independent third party.
Therefore, the N B contract can be considered as a gentlemen's agreement in which P promises p N B in exchange for e N B . If A accepts the agreement and delivers the required e¤ort level (i.e.,ẽ = e N B ), then P is free to ful…ll or renege on her promise to pay the price p N B . In this context, A appeals to the honesty of P to recompense the placed trust. Regardless of the contract o¤ered, we assume that P , independently of her type, never pays A if she observesẽ 6 = e B ; e N B . This can be justi…ed using the Roman words inadimplenti non est adimplendum, meaning that an individual is not obliged to respect his or her obligation if the counterpart has not respected his or her own.
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P 's revenue from A's performance is described by the production function y(e) = e , where 2 (0; 2) is exogenous and measures the marginal returns to e¤ort. 12 Its value is common knowledge. This is mainly a technological parameter, but it can also be subjective. For example, suppose that your TV is broken, your favorite program is about to start, and you call for a repair service. If you have other TVs, your can be relatively small, but if you have 1 0 With regard to guilt aversion in promises, see Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) . In relation to preferences including further moral considerations, see Camerer (2003) and Konow (2003) .
1 1 Since e¤ort is perfectly observable, P does not need to appeal to the agent's reciprocal behavior. Therefore, contrary to , we exclude any additional reward or bonus to be paid to the agent that di¤ers from the promised price. 1 2 2 would cause negative or in…nite utility to principals. If < 1, the production function shows decreasing returns to e¤ort; if = 1, the returns are constant; and if > 1, the returns are increasing.
only one TV, your can be very high. In general, is high when e¤ort is very valuable, such as for goods/services with strict time delivery, high-quality goods/services, and highly demanding markets with strong competitors and discerning customers. On the contrary, is low for standardized goods and in all cases in which e¤ort is not very valuable. Finally, we assume that the agent's cost of providing a given e¤ort e follows a standard cost function k(e) = 1 2 e 2 .
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If an N B contract is o¤ered, the utility functions are as follows:
y(e),ẽ 6 = e N B principal's utility from ful…lling N B
y(e),ẽ 6 = e N B principal's utility from reneging on N B
k(e),ẽ 6 = e N B agent's expected utility from N B.
For simplicity, we consider f = 0 if the principal is S-type, and f = 1 if she is H-type. 14 Thus, U If a B contract is o¤ered, the utility functions are as follows:
k(e),ẽ 6 = e B agent's utility from B.
In sum, the timing of the game consists of three stages. In stage 1, P observes her own type, and decides whether to o¤er a B or an N B contract to A according to the levels of , , and c. In stage 2, A decides whether to accept or reject the o¤er. If A rejects the o¤er, the game ends and both players obtain zero; otherwise, A decides on the e¤ort level to provide and waits for the payment. In stage 3, if the contract is binding andẽ = e B , P pays p B , whereas, if the contract is non-binding andẽ = e N B , P decides whether or not to pay p N B according to her type.
Players are matched randomly and interact only once in a one-shot game.
Below, this hypothesis will be relaxed to allow for …nitely repeated interactions.
We solve both games by searching for perfect Bayesian equilibria. The following proposition introduces some equilibrium properties that hold in both games.
Proposition 1 (a) Rejecting the principal's o¤ er (ẽ = 0) strictly dominates the delivery of an e¤ ort levelẽ 6 = e B ; e N B .
(b) No separating equilibrium exists.
(c) Deviating to an N B contract is never pro…table.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Part (a) implies that A either delivers the requested e¤ort or does not accept the o¤er. For instance, providing levels of e¤ort that are higher than e B or e N B -in accordance with the contract accepted -is simply not rewarding for A, because no P experiences a positive psychological impact that would reciprocate this behavior. As mentioned above, the H-type behavior is intended only in terms of ful…lling the promise and no incentive e¤ect will occur as in (twosided) reciprocity models. Part (b) implies that only pooling equilibria can exist. O¤ering an N B contract is more convenient to S than to H, since S will not pay the price and will not experience any psychological cost in reneging on the promise. Thus, whenever H prefers to o¤er an N B contract, S has the same incentive and must mimic H to make A accept the o¤er. Finally, part (c) implies that to prove the existence of a given equilibrium it is su¢ cient to prove that the parties cannot pro…tably deviate to any B contract.
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3 One-shot game Proposition 2 In a one-shot game, there exists an equilibrium in which P o¤ ers a B contract, which A accepts. This is a unique equilibrium if = 1 1+c , whereas, if > , there also exists a class of equilibria in which both H and S o¤ er an N B contract that A accepts.
The results predict that an N B contract may arise in equilibrium as the probability of facing an honest principal increases and/or the enforcement costs c increase. 15 In this case, multiple equilibria arise in N B contracts, with
A always obtaining zero and P obtaining positive payo¤s. Unfortunately, we cannot reduce the number of equilibria by applying standard re…nements, such as the Intuitive Criterion or the Divinity Criterion, because for any given equilibrium, A cannot exclude that a deviation to another equilibrium comes from one type of principal only. 16 Both H-type and S-type principals share the same preferences for the agent's beliefs (i.e., while trading, both types prefer A to believe that he is trading with an H-type) and for the equilibrium contracts.
This implies that when one type strictly prefers one equilibrium to another, the other type holds the same order of preferences. As a consequence, given two equilibria in the class of N B contracts, N B 1 and N B 2 , if H has an incentive to deviate from N B 1 to N B 2 , the same must hold for S. The same reasoning applies to any deviation from equilibria in B contracts to equilibria in N B contracts. In other words, whatever signal H sends, S always has an incentive to mimic and exploit the asymmetric information. The problem of multiple pooling equilibria is, however, of little relevance: since P chooses which contract to propose, it is plausible that she will choose the maximizing contract. Hence, in the subsequent analysis, it will turn out to be reasonable as well as useful to consider exclusively the principal's pro…t-maximizing equilibrium. This helps to solve the repeated game with no loss of generality and does not a¤ect the results for the subsequent welfare analysis.
Repeated game
Suppose the game is played repeatedly in a …xed matching for a …nite number of periods T , in which the value is common knowledge. The discount factor is assumed to be equal to 1. 17 In each period, P decides whether to propose an N B or a B contract to A. If P proposes an N B contract and breaches it in period t(< T ), then A infers that she is an S-type, and he will therefore refuse any N B contract from this principal in the future, only accepting B contracts.
Nevertheless, S may have the incentive to acquire strategic reputation for future transactions and consequently ful…ll non-binding contracts. Thus, we observe that in a one-shot game, A bases his beliefs, and therefore decides how much trust to place in his counterpart, exclusively on the share of honest individuals (i.e., ). In the repeated game, A bases his beliefs on and on the incentive for S to engage in reputation building. 18 S can acquire two levels of reputation.
One level of reputation is such that S proposes and ful…lls an N B contract, that is, S does not have an incentive to deviate to breaching the contract. This reputation is enough to sustain N B contracts and avoid the punishment for breaching, but it is not enough to a¤ect A's beliefs. Thus, although A trusts any P proposing an N B contract, the contract is second-best and we can refer to it as a second-best reputation. A …rst-best reputation is such that S proposes and ful…lls a …rst-best (F B) contract as if the agents'beliefs are such that = 1, that is as if A were to meet an H-type principal and no breach of the contract occurs. 19 If an F B contract is proposed in equilibrium, this must maximize P 's utility. 20 Accordingly, in an F B equilibrium the utility functions are the following:
Breaking the F B contract, which arises only o¤ the equilibrium path, would yield the following utilities:
Consider the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (a) S always breaks any promise in the last period T .
(b) If a B contract is chosen in equilibrium in the periods t + 1; :::; T , then S always breaks any promise in period t.
This lemma implies that A considers the last period T or the period before applying the B contract as a one-shot game. In particular, part (a) implies that no equilibrium exists, in which the F B contract is o¤ered in period T .
Consequently, in period T only N B or B contracts can be o¤ered, with S breaching the N B contract as in the one-shot game. Part (b) implies that no equilibrium exists in which the F B contract is o¤ered in periods 1; :::; t and a B contract is o¤ered thereafter. This marks an important di¤erence from the N B contract. The F B contract can be o¤ered and accepted only if A is sure about its ful…llment.
Proposition 3 In a repeated game, (a) There is an equilibrium in which the B contract applies in each period, and it is unique if .
, there also exist T 1 classes of equilibria, in which the F B contract applies in the periods 1; :::; t , with t T 1, and an N B contract thereafter, which S always honors except in period
, there also exists a class of equilibria, in which an N B contract applies in each period, which S always honors except in period T .
Equilibrium multiplicity also a¤ects repeated games, as highlighted by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) . Multiple equilibria cannot be reduced by using standard re…nements, but as in the one-shot game, it is plausible to assume pro…t-maximizing principals and sketch some general considerations about the e¤ects of reputation on parties'behavior and welfare.
As in the one-shot game, 8 < 1=2 and 8c 2 (0; 1), the equilibrium is a B contract in each period. This shows that reputation is not enough to …ll the lack of trust generated by low levels of . In other words, a threshold level of exists below which reputation cannot induce the adoption of N B contracts. In our model, this threshold requires at least the majority of players to be honest (i.e., ), and it depends on the enforcement costs existing in the legal system and for that speci…c transaction. (9) in the proof of Proposition 3 and solve for t ; we …nd that:
The …rst partial derivative of the right-hand side in the above inequality, within the interval of de…nition > , is positive in and c, and negative in . Further, as ! 1, t tends to reach its maximum, that is, T 1.
tracts expand at the expense of F B contracts. 22 On the contrary, as decreases, a …rst-best reputation is more easily sustainable. This result can be interpreted in the following way. High levels of refer to production functions in which e¤ort is very valuable, for example, in terms of quality of production, timely delivery, etc. The required e¤ort is, therefore, very high and so is its remuneration. This situation increases the incentive for S to break the F B contract due to the increasing gains to be achieved from reneging (i.e.,
However, an increasing share of honest individuals in the society can contrast this negative e¤ect. Thus, honesty becomes crucial to trigger high e¤ort levels when e¤ort is very valuable.
As regards the number of interactions T , its increase implies a higher t , which, as it stands, is not especially informative. Nevertheless, since Brown et al. 2004) , the more numerous the transactions, the more reputation will be acquired.
Finally, when P ful…lls the N B contract, A raises a positive payo¤. This is the cost for H-type principals of pooling equilibria, or read di¤erently, the cost of the lack of good signals (see Proposition 1(b)). As a consequence, the agent's expected utility increases as t decreases and reaches its highest level in the equilibrium in which the N B contract applies each period. When information on individuals' type is rather uncertain, that is, when is neither close to 0 (i.e., an untrustworthy P ) nor close to 1 (i.e., a trustworthy P ) the bene…ts of a second-best reputation are partly diverted to the agents. In this case, the less informed party receives a bene…t from uncertainty, which is paid in total by the more informed party, who needs to acquire reputation in repeated games.
Welfare analysis
In this section, we compare the welfare achieved by the private solution arising from a decentralized choice with that of the public solution, in which the production is centralized and all the players follow the instructions of a central planner. We proceed in the following way. First, we assess the environment in which a one-shot transaction relies exclusively on the trust level existing in a society, in which an enforcing legal system does not exist and only N B contracts can be applied. Second, we introduce a legal system with its enforcement schemes so that individuals have the choice of whether to use it or otherwise rely on trust, as described in the previous sections through the choice between costly B contracts and N B contracts. Third, we add the repeated interactions, as shown in section 4, to assess the impact of strategic reputation on the levels of welfare.
The optimal public solution identi…es the …rst-best social surplus that is achievable as if no enforcement cost and no asymmetric information could occur, whereby a social planner can impose the e¢ cient e¤ort level. The public solution corresponds to what we referred to in the previous section as an F B contract.
We call W the welfare function identifying the social surplus. The …rst-best social surplus is:
This is the maximum achievable social surplus for any given .
No enforcing legal system
Consider a transaction in which no legal system exists or is able to enforce the terms of the exchange. What we presented as an N B contract mirrors this 2 3 The result follows from maxe e 1 2 e 2 . Note that
situation exactly. The welfare function for N B contracts yields the following social surplus: 24 wherein W N B is calculated in the pro…t-maximizing equilibrium.
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In the following, we measure the e¢ ciency levels ( ) achievable under a decentralized solution in terms of the distance between its social surplus and the …rst-best social surplus. Therefore, W N B will be compared in percentage terms We …nd that the overall e¢ ciency level in the absence of an enforcing legal system, calculated for the entire domain of the plane ( ; ), is:
2 4 Note that
> 0, and
Since A obtains zero in the N B equilibria predicted in Propositions 2 and 3, it emerges that W N B , which is calculated in the pro…t-maximizing equilibrium, is the highest social surplus achievable when an N B contract is o¤ered.
This value implies that self-enforcing transactions waste, on average, slightly less than 40% of the surplus with respect to a putative equilibrium in …rst-best.
In Figure 1 , the overall e¢ ciency level corresponds to the volume of the surface in the cuboid. We can also compute N B for given levels of in the entire domain of . Table 1 . E¢ ciency levels (% ) in the absence of an enforcing legal system .
Low levels of (i.e., 0:1) allow for high levels of e¢ ciency, even in the presence of low levels of , whereas, high levels of (i.e., 1:9) reduce e¢ ciency even in the presence of high values of . This means that self-enforcing transactions are not generally able to achieve high e¢ ciency levels in the presence of increasing marginal returns to e¤ort. In other words, when e¤ort is highly valuable, a centralized solution considerably reduces the distortions occurring in incomplete contracting. As e¤ort shows diminishing marginal returns, as we normally expect in common production functions, the private solution approaches the public solution.
One-shot game
As expected, the absence of a legal system, in which only unenforceable transactions can be clinched, generally yields serious ine¢ ciencies for low levels of trust (i.e., low ). These ine¢ ciencies are, however, attenuated for transactions in which e¤ort is not valuable. In particular, if is low, such as in standardized production, an enforcing legal system may not be very useful. For high levels of , such as in high-quality production, timely deliveries, etc., an enforcing legal system may be socially desirable.
Consider the hypothetical introduction of an enforcing legal system, protecting property rights and allowing for veri…able and enforceable contracts. In these circumstances, individuals can decide whether to apply a B or an N B contract, as in sections 2 to 4. Assume that this option refers to a one-shot transaction. From proposition 2, the pro…t-maximizing equilibrium in the oneshot game (OS) contemplates the adoption of a B contract if and an N B contract if > . Accordingly, the welfare function of the one-shot game, W OS , is the following
First, we know that the choice between B contracts and N B contracts does 20 not depend on . This implies that for each couple of values ( ; c), the e¢ ciency levels are evaluated for the entire domain of either in a B contract or in an N B contract, depending on the choice made in the OS setting. The overall e¢ ciency level of the OS setting is:
This is a striking result if compared with N B , because it shows that introducing an enforcing legal system and, therefore, widening the contractual choice over transactions improves the overall e¢ ciency by about 9 percentage points with respect to a transaction system that is exclusively based on trust.
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Nonetheless, the one-shot game wastes on average slightly less than 30% of the potential social surplus achievable with a public solution.
Consider OS for speci…c values of , c, and , as shown in Table 2 . Table 2 . Punctual e¢ ciency levels (% ) of one-shot gam e equilibria for =f0:1;1:0;1:9g.
In Table 2 , the N B contract is chosen, regardless of , for = 0:9 and c = f0:5; 0:9g, and the B contract is chosen otherwise. Even if does not play any role in the contractual choice, the level of plays a role in the e¢ ciency levels achieved by the chosen contract. For = 0:1, the e¢ ciency is particularly high and close to 100% for any combination of ( ; c). For = 1, the e¢ ciency is still high and greater than 90%, for either low levels of c or high levels of , and it signi…cantly decreases otherwise. Finally, for = 1:9, the e¢ ciency collapses to values very close to 0; a reduction in c and/or an increase in lessens this negative e¤ect.
In more detail, by comparing Table 1 and Table 2 it is easy to check that the region where the B contract is chosen can be split into two further regions:
one where the choice of the B contract is welfare-improving with respect to the N B contract and another where the N B contract outperforms the B contract in terms of social surplus (and thus in terms of e¢ ciency), although the N B contract is not eventually chosen. In Table 2 Proof. See the Appendix.
As seen above, in terms of e¢ ciency, the gains from the …rst region are higher overall than the loss from the second region. The …gure below depicts the second region, which is actually a surface. Lemma 2 and Figure 3 show that the region becomes smaller as grows.
We can conclude that, in a one-shot game, the introduction of an enforcing legal system, and the consequent freedom regarding which contract to choose, is detrimental to the social surplus for a level of beyond a certain threshold, but below , and especially for diminishing marginal returns to e¤ort. On the contrary, the choice of binding agreements helps to improve the e¢ ciency as the enforcement costs are kept low and honest behavior is not widespread. In addition, for high levels of , a self-enforcing system of trade is highly inef…cient, and the opportunity to appeal to a formal and protected exchange is welfare-improving and becomes socially desirable, especially if enforcement is not particularly costly.
Repeated game
In this section, we want to understand whether or not strategic reputation a¤ects e¢ ciency. The overall e¢ ciency level of the multiple equilibria in the 
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From the numerical simulations, we can appreciate a certain increase in the overall e¢ ciency levels with respect to one-shot games. This is due to the transactions occurring with F B contracts if > (see Proposition 3). As expected, as T increases, the e¢ ciency increases accordingly. We have shown above that, for a given triple ( ; ; c) as > , an increase in T brings about a relatively larger number of F B contracts with respect to N B contracts, which increases the average social surplus and, consequently, the overall e¢ ciency levels of the repeated-game setting. Nevertheless, the increase in overall e¢ ciency does not seem to be very sensitive to an increase in T : the interactions must become very large (e.g., from 10 to 1000) to achieve an increase in overall e¢ ciency of about 2 percentage points. Table 3 presents the e¢ ciency levels. Note that changes in T can a¤ect the e¢ ciency levels only for the cases of = 0:9 and c = f0:5; 0:9g, regardless of ; that is, for > , where N B and F B contracts apply. In all other cases, the e¢ ciency levels do not change and are equal to those calculated for the one-shot setting. For these reasons, the table below displays the changes in T only for = 0:9 to appreciate the changes in the e¢ ciency levels.
2 7 W RG is calculated by assuming that principals maximize their utility when proposing an N B contract in some periods as > . Therefore, W RG corresponds to the maximum social surplus achievable when an N B contract is chosen in one or more periods. Table 3 . Punctual e¢ ciency levels (% ) of rep eated-gam e equilibria for =f0:1;1:0;1:9g.
In more detail, the table above highlights that the main e¢ ciency gains with respect to the one-shot setting arise for increasing marginal returns to e¤ort (i.e., = 1:9) and when non-binding agreements are clinched (i.e., = 0:9 and c = f0:5; 0:9g). This is due to the positive e¤ects of reputation on trust, which allow the implementation of F B contracts. Consider the following triple ( = 0:9; = 1:9; c = 0:5): the di¤erence in e¢ ciency levels between T = 1; 000
and T = 100 is substantial (i.e., from 39.17% to 92.52%). Nevertheless, with the same triple, no di¤erence is seen between T = 100 and T = 10. This means that the number of interactions may not be high enough to implement equilibria with some F B contracts during the …rst interactions (as predicted by Proposition 3). For a low number of interactions, the incentive for S to break F B contracts is high because the "time span" is not long enough. The agents would then only accept N B contracts until the end of the games, because they do not put enough trust in the incentive for S to acquire reputation. In other words, a …rst-best reputation can be acquired and trust can be granted only if T exceeds a certain threshold, otherwise it is not sustainable and, consequently, it does not play any role.
In sum, without repeated interactions, the gains from trade may remain largely unexploited for all forms of production in which e¤ort is very valuable (i.e., high ), such as high-quality goods/services, goods/services for which the time delivery is of extreme importance, and in general all goods/services in which the agent's e¤ort can make the di¤erence with respect to the principal's competitors or the customers'satisfaction. The introduction of repeated interactions in the production of these goods and services can trigger reputational mechanisms that …ll the e¢ ciency gap and increase the social surplus. However, these gains can be obtained only when informal agreements are normally chosen (i.e., = 0:9 and c = f0:5; 0:9g) and only if the transactions are repeated a certain number of times such that a "strong" (…rst-best) reputation can be acquired. In all other cases in which e¤ort is very valuable, the legal system induces individuals to apply B contracts; consequently, the positive e¤ects that reputation can produce do not come to light. Finally, reputation is not particularly valuable -regardless of the contract chosen -in standardized production and in all kinds of production in which increasing levels of e¤ort do not provide large gains.
Discussion and conclusion
We have used a simple model to examine the choice between binding and nonbinding contracts by two types of informed principals, one who is honest and ful…lls her non-binding promises and another one who acts on purely sel…sh grounds and may renege on her promises if convenient. We have also assessed the welfare implications for parties' transactions when an enforcing legal system is introduced and allows for binding contracts, which are veri…able and 26 enforceable at a cost. The choice between these two types of contracts in equilibrium depends on two variables: the enforcement costs and the widespread honesty level. In particular, the worse the legal institutions, the more likely are gentlemen's agreements among the parties. This holds in both a one-shot game and a …nitely repeated game, independently of the number of interactions, meaning that reputation does not a¤ect the choice of contract to implement. A third variable, measuring the marginal returns to e¤ort, does not in ‡uence this choice.
In repeated games, a principal can acquire two levels of reputation. The …rst is a "…rst-best" reputation, whereby the agent fully trusts the principal to ful…ll what we called a …rst-best contract. In this case, the agent's trust is equal to certainty, and this is incorporated into a non-binding contract that requires higher e¤ort levels than any other non-binding contracts. The second level is a "second-best" reputation, whereby the agent trusts the principal to ful…ll a non-binding contract. Nevertheless, the levels of trust are not su¢ cient to allow the principal to incorporate certainty fully into a non-binding contract. The sel…sh principal would still be tempted to breach a …rst-best contract.
Of course, reputation works only if non-binding contracts are implemented, that is, only for high shares of honest individuals and/or high enforcement costs.
In these circumstances, we …nd that when e¤ort is highly valuable, for example, in terms of quality of production, timely delivery, etc., the sel…sh principal cannot acquire a …rst-best reputation due to the high gains to be achieved from reneging. On the contrary, if e¤ort is not particularly valuable, such as in standardized production, petty trade, or traditional agricultural contracts, a …rst-best reputation can more easily be established. Thus, reputation cannot sustain very valuable contracts and only an increasing share of honest individuals in the society can contrast this negative e¤ect.
This model has been scrutinized in terms of the achievable e¢ ciency levels. Through numerical simulations, we have accurately estimated the overall e¢ ciency level (i.e., in the entire range of the variables) of the non-binding contracts as if no legal system could enforce the terms of a contract and only self-enforcing agreements can take place by relying exclusively on the share of honest individuals existing in a society. Trading without an enforcing legal system wastes roughly less than 40% of all the social surplus that a social planner could otherwise achieve by coordinating the transactions. Self-enforcing transactions generally achieve rather low e¢ ciency levels in the presence of increasing marginal returns to e¤ort. As e¤ort shows diminishing marginal returns, as we normally expect in a large part of production functions, the private solution approaches the public solution.
Interestingly, once a legal system protecting property rights is introduced, and consequently, once individuals can choose between legally binding contracts and informal non-binding contracts, then the overall e¢ ciency level increases by about nine percentage points. The gains occur mainly with low shares of honest individuals, low enforcement costs, and especially when e¤ort is highly valuable.
In these circumstances, an enforcing legal system may be socially desirable.
However, this is not always the case when the shares of honest individuals and the levels of enforcement costs are neither too high nor too low. In this case, an enforcing legal system can be a welfare-reducing institution since, from a social viewpoint, an informal agreement would have performed better but it is not eventually chosen. This problem is more signi…cant when e¤ort is not particularly valuable.
If the interaction is repeated a …nite number of times, reputational e¤ects may come into play. Of course, reputation can play a role only if individuals' honesty or strategic behavior can be disclosed, as in the non-binding agree-ments. We …nd that the most considerable gains in terms of e¢ ciency arise for increasing marginal returns to e¤ort, but only if the game is repeated a su¢ cient number of times to trigger a …rst-best reputation that can be spent for a long period. Thus, reputation can be a very important welfare-enhancing factor in the production of goods or services with strict timely delivery schedules, goods or services providing high standards, and, in general, all goods or services for which e¤ort is critical with respect to competition or customers' satisfaction. When repeated interactions occur, the enforcing legal system sacri…ces the welfare-enhancing role of reputation, especially in the production of these goods and services when a binding form of agreement is usually chosen. with 2 (0; 1) before that A supplies the required e¤ort, in order to signal her type and discourage S to propose an N B contract. H will eventually pay the price promised, whereas S would lose the installment if she wants to signal to be a H-type. Therefore, the signal is credible if it is su¢ ciently high to discourage S from proposing an N B contract in equilibrium and paying the installment. Assume that A will provide the e¤ort requested after having received the installment; the following condition must hold:
This condition never holds 8 < 1.
(c) In general, consider a game between two players where one has private
information. An equilibrium exists if the player with private information has no pro…table deviation, whatever the beliefs the other player can hold about that deviation. In our case, consider a pooling equilibrium in which both types of P o¤er a given contract, but one or both types deviate to an N B contract. A has to form some beliefs about such a deviation. Suppose A believes that the deviation comes from an H-type principal, so that A would accept the proposal as long as his expected utility is non-negative. However, this out-of-equilibrium belief is inconsistent because S would always deviate to an N B contract in order to exploit A's beliefs. Thus, A's beliefs that a deviation to an N B contract would come from S must be strictly positive. In addition, the deviating principal can not exclude that A holds adverse beliefs that such a deviation comes from S, then A would reject the deviating contract. This excludes any pro…table deviation to any o¤-equilibrium N B contracts.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider an equilibrium where both types of P o¤er a B contract. A will accept a B contract (p B ; e B ) if it satis…es his participation constraint:
P has full bargaining power, thus she can satisfy the agent's participation constraint as an equality without loss of generality. Substituting (3) holding as an equality into the principal's utility function, U B P , and maximizing with respect to e, we obtain e B and p B , such that:
. Both e B and p B are increasing in and decreasing in c. A principal o¤ering a B contract will therefore obtain:
This equilibrium exists because (i ) Proposition 1(c) proves that deviating to an N B contract is never pro…table, and (ii ) P cannot pro…tably deviate to any other B contract because she would get a lower payo¤. Thus, the B contract at equilibrium is always pro…t-maximizing. Note that 8c 2 (0; 1) and 8 2 (0; 2),
P is always decreasing in c, whereas it is increasing in only if (c), with (c) > 1.
Consider now an equilibrium where both types of P o¤er an N B contract.
A's expected utility will be:
Thus, A will accept the o¤er if and only if:
This participation constraint holds as an equality without loss of generality.
Since U
N B H
= e 1 2 e 2 < e = U N B S , if H has no incentive to deviate to a B contract, then it must also be true for S. Therefore, we can exclude that such a deviation is pro…table if:
Thus, any couple (e; p(e)) satisfying condition (5) is an equilibrium because Proposition 1(c) excludes any deviation to another N B contract. To prove that this class of equilibria (e; p(e)) in N B contracts is non-empty, we maximize U
with respect to e. We obtain:
Note that both e N B and p N B are always increasing at an increasing rate in , and if 1=2, also increasing in . 28 The H-type principal will then obtain:
which is always increasing in ; and in if 1=2 and ( ), with ( ) > 1.
Note that 8 2 (0; 1) and 8 2 (0; 2), U
> 0. S will only care about her monetary utility. Thus, she will renege on the contract and will obtain: Proof of Lemma 1. The proofs of both parts (a) and (b) follow straightforward from the fact that S has no interest to maintain reputation in period t if t = T , or if a B contract is o¤ered from period t + 1 onwards.
Proof of Proposition 3.
(a) Consider a backward induction procedure.
Starting from period T , regardless of the value of 2 (0; 1), consider an equilibrium in which P o¤ers a pro…t-maximizing B contract (e B ; p B ). This equilibrium exists because, on one hand, Proposition 1(c) excludes in any period a deviation to an N B contract, and on the other hand, deviating to another B contract is simply not pro…table for P . This reasoning applies to all periods t < T . We now prove that this equilibrium is unique if . Note that in the last period T , A would refuse the F B contract due to Lemma 1(a). Consider then a putative equilibrium where P proposes an N B contract. If then Hence, the equilibrium is unique.
(b) Consider the equilibrium where the F B contract is o¤ered in each period until period t < T and an N B contract is o¤ered thereafter. Consider the last period T ; we know that a deviation to the F B contract is refused by A due to Lemma 1(a). A deviation to another N B contract (e.g., by charging a di¤erent price or by requiring a di¤erent e¤ort level) is also excluded by Proposition 1(c).
Finally, Proposition 2 shows that no deviation to a B contract is pro…table to P since > > , and the class of equilibria in the N B contracts is non-empty.
Thus an N B contract applies in period T . Suppose now that t < T 1. For every t 2 [t + 1; T 1], > implies that any P has no pro…table deviation to a B contract and Proposition 1(c) implies that P has no pro…table deviation to another N B contract. Since any breaking of an N B contract would be punished by A by accepting only B contracts, it is easy to show that S has no pro…table deviation to breaking the contract in any period. Then, two conditions must hold contemporaneously. First, S has a pro…table deviation to breaking F B in t + 1. Second, S has no pro…table deviation to breaking F B in t . Thus, it must hold that (t + 1)U (8) Conditions (7) and (8) 
The endpoints of the interval are increasing in t and T 2 intervals exist with the lower endpoint for t = 1 equal to: 
Finally, if t = T 1, condition (7) does not apply because in no circumstance does A accept an F B contract in the last period due to Lemma 1(b). Condition (8) applies, meaning that S should have no pro…table deviation to breaking the F B contract in t = T 1. Therefore, condition (8) holds if:
As expected, the lower endpoint of this interval is equal to the upper endpoint of the interval in condition (9) when t = T 2. It follows that (T 1) classes of equilibria exist as > , with monotone and increasing in t , and each class corresponds to di¤erent intervals of < < 1, which do not intersect with each other. 
